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CHAPTER I 
 
ARE TARIFF REDUCTIONS ALWAYS PRO-COMPETITIVE: A CASE OF 
BETRAND COMPETITION IN DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS 
 
Introduction 
 Are reductions in trade costs a substitute for competition policy when firms 
compete in an international environment? Are the effects of trade liberalization1 
always pro-competitive and does it matter whether firms compete in quantities or 
prices? These are questions that various literatures have attempted to address. While 
some studies have assumed cost symmetries among competing firms (Rotemberg and 
Saloner 1989, Syropoulos 1992, Mendi, Moner-Colonques and Sempere-Monerris, 
2006), and Bond and Syropoulos, 2008; others (Fung 1992) have considered cost 
asymmetries between firms in examining the effects of reduction in trade costs on 
collusion and the strategic interactions among firms. In examining these effects, these 
studies have assumed either product homogeneity or differentiation, single-market or 
multi-market contacts and price or quantity competition. While most of these 
literatures focused on interactions among firms in a single market setting, evidence 
suggests that international cartels usually involve multi-market interactions.  
 Davidson (1984) studied the effects of trade costs on collusive incentives of 
oligopolistic firms in a single market setting and found that trade costs make 
deviations more attractive to the home firm than the foreign firm because they 
introduce cost asymmetries, so that the domestic firm gets a higher market share than 
the foreign. In such a setting, Davidson showed that trade costs in the neighborhood 
of free trade make collusion more sustainable. Diverting away from the single-market 
                                                
1
 Used interchangeably as a reduction in tariff or trade cost, although it can take on various other facets.  
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setting assumption and assuming multi-market interactions, Bond and Syropoulos 
(2008) examined the effect of trade liberalization on cartel profitability and 
sustainability in the presence of binding incentive constraints. They considered 
quantity competition in homogenous and differentiated products and in both cases, 
found that trade liberalization facilitates collusion in the neighborhood of free trade 
but makes collusion harder to sustain in the neighborhood of the prohibitive tariff. 
Thus, the effects of trade liberalization on collusion seem to depend on the initial 
levels of trade costs. In particular, trade liberalization is pro-collusive when trade 
costs are already low but pro-competitive when trade costs are high. Does this result 
also carry over to situations in which firms compete in prices? To examine this, I 
extend the model of Bond and Syropoulos (2005) in which firms compete in a multi-
market setting with differentiated products but compete in prices instead of quantities.  
 My motivation for studying the case of price competition is that in reality, 
firms are more likely to choose prices and let the market determine the demand at 
such prices. Although firms can conceivably choose quantities especially when there 
are capacity constraints, if firms are looking to support collusion by harsher 
punishment payoffs, choosing prices would be better than choosing quantities, hence 
my focus on prices. 
 I find that the relationship between trade costs and the minimum discount 
factor for which the collusive outcome is sustainable depends, to a great extent, on the 
degree of product substitutability and the initial levels of trade costs— for sufficiently 
low degree of product substitutability and intermediate trade costs or extremely high 
degree of product substitutability, the minimum discount factor is monotonically 
increasing and in such cases, trade liberalization is pro-collusive. On the other hand, 
for intermediate degrees of product substitutability, the minimum discount factor is 
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decreasing for low levels of trade costs and increasing for sufficiently high levels of 
trade costs. In such cases, trade liberalization can be either pro-competitive or pro-
collusive depending on the initial levels of trade costs. 
This result suggests that the effect of trade liberalization on collusion is 
dependent on the degree to which the traded goods are substitutable and the prevailing 
levels of trade costs—high or low. While reductions from low levels of trade cost may 
be pro-competitive, reductions from high levels may not. 
Since trade liberalization may make collusion more difficult to sustain for 
some levels of trade cost, one would expect welfare enhancing effects of trade 
liberalization for such levels of trade costs. Thus, I considered the effect of a tariff 
reduction on social welfare for both the collusive outcome and the Nash equilibrium 
and find as expected that social welfare is unambiguously improved with a tariff 
reduction for both cases.  
The effect of transport costs, as opposed to tariffs, on social welfare is also 
considered and I find that although tariff reductions are welfare enhancing, reductions 
in transport costs may not be, depending on the initial levels of transport cost. In 
particular, when transport costs are sufficiently high enough that trade would be 
eliminated, reductions in transport cost are welfare reducing but when transport costs 
are initially low enough that trade occurs, further reductions in transport cost are 
welfare enhancing. Thus, a reduction in trade cost has welfare enhancing effect only if 
trade occurred before the reduction in cost.   
Bond and Syropoulos (2008) observed that trade liberalization will lead to an 
improvement in domestic welfare if and only if it results in a reduction in the 
domestic price. When trade occurs, the foreign firm charges a price that is increasing 
in the per-unit trade cost. Thus, a reduction in trade cost means a reduction in the 
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export price. Also, the price charged by the domestic firm reduces as a result 
(strategic complementarity of prices). Although firms’ profits from their home 
markets decrease, the increase in consumers’ surplus and export revenues more than 
makes up for the decrease in home market profits so that welfare increases overall. 
Thus, a tariff reduction reduces the domestic price and ultimately leads to welfare 
enhancement.  
 
Price Competition and the Non-Cooperative Equilibrium 
 I consider a symmetric, two country Bertrand Oligopoly in differentiated 
products with a single firm in each country. Markets are assumed to be segmented so 
that consumers can only buy the goods from their domestic markets. Firms are 
symmetric in that they have the same zero marginal cost of production and each firm 
has a linear inverse demand function given by: 
*p A q xγ= − −
 , *p A x qγ= − − , * *p A q xγ= − − , * *p A x qγ= − −  where  ( , )p p  are 
prices of the domestic firm in the domestic and foreign markets respectively,  ( *, *)p p  
are prices of the foreign firm in the foreign and domestic markets respectively, ( , )q x  
are domestic output and export by the domestic firm respectively, * *( , )q x are foreign 
output and export by the foreign firm respectively, A  is a market demand parameter 
and γ is a measure of the degree of substitutability between domestic output and 
export with 0 1γ< < .   
By inverting the inverse demand functions, I have  *q a bp d p= − +  , 
* *  q a bp d p= − +
 ,  *x a b p dp= − + , *  *x a b p dp= − +   where /(1 )a A γ= + , 21/(1 )b γ= − , 
2/(1 )d γ γ= −
 and each of the above quantities have non-negativity constraints. In 
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particular, given per unit trade cost t , the range of prices for which domestic output 
and export of the home firm are respectively positive satisfy: 
max ( *) (1 ) *p p p A pγ γ< ≡ − +                           (i) 
min max1( *) min{ ,  - ( (1 ) *)} ( *) (1 ) *p p t A p p p p A pγ γ γ γ≡ − − < < ≡ − +  (ii) 
By symmetry, the ranges of prices for the foreign firm satisfy: 
max
* * ( ) (1 )p p p A pγ γ< ≡ − +                           (iii) 
*min *max1( ) min{ ,  - ( (1 ) )} * ( ) (1 )p p t A p p p p A pγ γ γ γ≡ − − < < ≡ − +  (iv) 
The following proposition established the best responses of each firm to the other 
firm’s choice of prices in the domestic and foreign market respectively. 
Proposition 1 
If firms do not play weakly dominated strategies, the best responses of the 
firms given γ  and t are 
2
2
2
2
( 1)
                                p  
(1 ) ( 1) ( 2 )
+      <  
2 2 2
*
( 1) ( 2 ) ( 2 )
            <  
2 2
( 2 )
                           
2 2
A t
t
A t p A t A tp
p
A p A t A tp
A t A tp
γ
γ
γ γ γ γ γ γ
γ γ
γ γ γ γ γ γ
γ γ
γ γ
− + ≤

 − + − + − − +
<
−
= 
− + − − + − + ≤
−

+ − +≥

     


    ;        
2
2
2
2
( 1)0                          p *   
(1 ) * ( 1) ( 2 )
+      <  *
2 2 2
( 1) * ( 2 ) ( 2 )
       *  <  
2 2
( 2 )
                           *     
2 2
     
A
A p A Ap
p
A p A Ap
A Ap
γ
γ
γ γ γ γ γ
γ γ
γ γ γ γ
γ γ
γ
− ≤

 − − − −
<
−
= 
− + − − − ≤
−

− ≥

 
Proof: 
Global profits for the domestic and foreign firm are given respectively as: 
              
( , *, , *, ) ( *) ( )( *)p p p p t p a bp dp p t a bp dp∏ = − + + − − +
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*( , *, , *, ) *( * ) ( * )( * )p p p p t p a bp dp p t a bp dp∏ = − + + − − +
 
 Letting iΠ  denote partial derivative of global profit with respect to i , the first order 
conditions for the home firm’s optimization problem are: 
              
* 2p a dp bp∏ = + −  
              
* 2p a bt dp bp∏ = + + −  
By symmetry, the first order conditions for the foreign firm’s optimization problem 
are: 
              * 2 *p a dp bp∏ = + −  
             * 2 *p a bt dp bp∏ = + + −  
First, if a firm’s rival sets a price such that the maximum price it can set as a 
function of its rival’s price, would be less than the firm’s marginal cost, the firm’s 
best response would be to set at least its marginal cost and supply nothing. For 
instance, if the domestic firm sets a price p ≤ (A (γ-1) +t)/γ, then the foreign firm can 
choose to set its price at the level of trade cost or at any price greater than max* ( )p p  
and any of these prices would be a best response. At these prices, export as well as the 
corresponding profit would be zero. Although the foreign firm can conceivably 
choose any price below t and supply zero export so that its profit are still zero, such a 
choice of price is eliminated under the assumption that firms do not play weakly 
dominated strategies. Prices below t are weakly dominated strategies because they 
yield the same zero profit as setting *p t= as long as export is zero, but negative 
profits when the price is sufficiently low that export would be positive.  
If a firm’s rival sets an interior price for which two-way trade can occur, then 
the firm’s best response would be to set a price which corresponds to positive output 
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levels. Thus, the interior price pair for which trade occurs is derived by solving for the 
prices at which the above first order conditions equal zero.  
If a firm chooses the highest price that just forces its rival out of the market, 
but which is less than the single firm monopoly price, the best response of its rival 
would be to choose a price which is at least the maximum price it can set in that 
market and supply nothing. The maximum price any firm can set in each market is the 
price at which its rival’s output equals zero and this price is derived by equating the 
rival’s demand function in that market to zero and solving for the price.  
Finally, for any price choice of its rival which is at least as high as the 
monopoly price, the firm’s best response would be to choose its monopoly price.    
 
The figure below illustrates the various sections of the reaction functions for 
the domestic and foreign firm with 2p representing the price of the foreign firm and 
1p  that of the domestic firm.
2
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Reaction Functions for the Domestic and Foreign Firm 
                                                
2
 For zero exports, any price in the shaded region is also a best response by the foreign firm. 
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The firms’ reaction functions are piecewise linear and piecewise differentiable; in 
particular, the slope of the reaction functions are less than unity in some trade cost 
ranges for which exports are positive [  p  p*
 < 1
 p*  p 2
γ∂ ∂
= =
∂ ∂
] , greater than unity for 
higher trade cost ranges for which exports are zero [  p  p* 1
 > 1
 p*  p γ
∂ ∂
= =
∂ ∂
] and flattens 
out at the monopoly price after that. Moreover, the foreign firm’s reaction function is 
increasing in trade costs for positive exports, thereby allowing the domestic firm to 
increase its price since the firms’ prices are strategic complements; thus, the resulting 
Nash equilibrium will be sensitive to the prevailing levels of trade costs.  
Given the reaction functions of the firms, the following proposition establishes 
a unique Nash equilibrium in which no firm plays a weakly dominated strategy. 
Proposition 2 
There exist a unique Nash equilibrium in which,  
               
2
2 2
2
*
2
(1 )(2 ) (2 )
        0  t
4 2
( 1) + t (2 ) (2 )
                < t  
2 2
(2 )
                                   t > 
2 2
N N
A t A
A A Ap p
A A
γ γ γ γ γ
γ γ
γ γ γ γ
γ γ
γ

− + + − −≤ ≤
− −

− − − −
= = ≤
−

−


 
2
2 2
2
*
2
(1 )( 2 ) 2 ( 2 )
       0   t
4 2
( 2 ) ( 2 )
t                                      <  t   
2 2
( 2 )
                              t >  
2 2
     
N N
A t A
A Ap p
A t A
γ γ γ γ
γ γ
γ γ γ
γ
γ

− + + − −≤ ≤
− −

− − −
= = ≤
−
 + −


 
Proof: 
Assuming that trade costs are such that the zero output lines for both firms are always 
above their best response lines so that the reaction functions are as given in 
Proposition 1, then it is easy to show that the equilibrium prices in the domestic 
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market are as given above and derive directly from the intersection of the best 
response functions.   
Proposition 3 
The corresponding Nash Equilibrium profits for the equilibrium price pair 
above are: 
2 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2
2 2 2 2
2
*
2 2
2
2 ( 2) 2 ( 2) ( 3 4) (2 )
       0  t     ( 4) (1 ) 2
( )[ ( 1) + t] (2 ) (2 )( ) ( )                                                         < t < 
2 2
 
4
N N
A At t A
A t A A A
t t
A
γ γ γ γ γ γ γ γ
γ γ γ
γ γ γ γ
γ γ
+ − − + − + − + − −≤ ≤
− − −
− − − − −∏ = ∏ =
−
(2 )
                                                                                     t   
2
     
A γ







−≥

           (1) 
Proof: 
Derives directly from substitution of the equilibrium prices into the expression for 
global profits.   
 
The global Nash equilibrium profits are the same for both firms so that I can 
henceforth focus only on the competition in the home market without any loss of 
generality. 
When trade costs are high so that exports are zero, the Nash equilibrium profit 
is strictly concave in t, increasing for 2
2
(2 ) (2 )
t < 
2 2
A Aγ γ γ
γ
− − −≤
−
 and maximized at 
(2 )
t = 
2
A γ−
. For the interior equilibrium, the Nash equilibrium profit is strictly convex 
in t; in particular, ( )0Nt∏ > <  as 
2 2
4 2
(1 ) (2 )( )
3 4
A
t
γ γ
γ γ
− +
> <
− +
 and is minimized at 
2 2
min 4 2
(1 ) (2 )
3 4
N At γ γ
γ γ
− +
=
− +
 which is decreasing in the degree of substitutability, γ , and 
approaches A as 0γ →  (goods become relatively more independent) and zero as 1γ →  
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(goods become close substitutes). The prohibitive level of trade cost that drives the 
foreign firm out of the domestic market completely under the Nash equilibrium with 
positive exports is 2
(1 )(2 )
2
N At γ γ
γ
− +
=
−
, suggesting that the level of trade cost for 
which exports is prohibited in a homogenous products market in which firms have the 
same marginal cost and compete in prices is zero.  It is also observed that 
2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2
(1 ) 2 (1 ) (2 )( ) ( ) (0)
(2 ) ( 4) (1 )
N N NA At γ γ γ
γ γ γ
− − +∏ = < > ∏ =
− − −
 as 0(1)γ → . This is a similarity between 
the Cournot and Bertrand competition. In the homogenous products case, a 
prohibitive trade cost yields the monopoly profit for the home firm because it 
completely drives the foreign firm out of the domestic market and makes the domestic 
firm a monopoly in the home market. As goods become differentiated, exports 
become important for firms’ profits so that at the prohibitive trade cost, exports are 
zero and firms’ profits are significantly reduced. 
 Thus, trade costs in the neighborhood of the prohibitive level of trade cost are 
a way to shield domestic firms from competition in a homogenous products market. 
However, the effect on profit of such prohibitive trade costs is different for the 
Bertrand case than for the Cournot. In the Bertrand case, the firm’s profit continues to 
increase in the trade cost even after trade has been eliminated, but for the Cournot 
case, the firm’s profit does not change.  
 
Tariffs Vs. Transport Costs—Effect on Social Welfare 
Although it is irrelevant for firms whether trade costs take the form of tariff or 
transport costs since they enter the firms’ profits in the same way, when considering 
welfare effects, it is important that the effects of tariffs be treated separately from the 
effects of trade costs.  
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When trade costs take the form of transport costs instead of tariffs, the effect 
on equilibrium prices remain the same as that of a tariff since firms perceive both 
costs to be an increase in the per unit cost of supplying output in the foreign market. 
Since equilibrium prices remain the same under both scenarios, equilibrium outputs 
remain the same as well as equilibrium profits. Thus, consumers’ surplus and profits 
are unchanged in the social welfare function. However, transportation costs, as 
opposed to tariffs, do not generate any export revenues for the government so that 
social welfare is just the sum of consumers’ surplus and profit only.  
In that case, social welfare with transportation cost is given as: 
2
2 *2 * *
2
2
2 2
0 0 0 2
(2 )1 2  (q ) ( * )       0  t < 
2
    
(2 ) (2 )1 2  (q )                                              
2 2
N
A
x qx pq p t x
V
A Ap q t
γ γγ
γ
γ γ γ
γ
 − −
+ + + + − ≤
−
= 
− − − + ≤ <

−
 
  where 0 0q, q ,  p, and p  are Nash equilibrium quantities and prices with 
subscripts denoting quantity (price) for the corner solution. Substituting these into the 
above formula yields the welfare expression: 
2 2 2 2 4 2
2 2 2 2
2
2 2
2( )(1 )(3 2 )(2 ) (12 9 2 ) (2 )
      0  t < 
2(4 ) (1 ) 2
    
( )[ (2 1) ] (2 ) (2 )
                                                         
2 2 2
N
A At t A
V
A t A t A A
t
γ γ γ γ γ γ γ
γ γ γ
γ γ γ γ
γ γ
 − − − + + − + − −≤
− − −
= 
− − + − − − ≤ <

−
  For
2
2
(2 )0
2
A
t
γ γ
γ
− −≤ <
−
, there is an interior solution in which two-way trade 
occurs and welfare with transport costs is convex in t. For transport costs sufficiently 
low, exports are positive; a further decline in transport costs causes the profit of the 
home firm in the home market to decrease but the increase in consumer surplus and 
export profit from the foreign market more than compensates for the decline in profits 
in the home market so that welfare improves overall. But for sufficiently high tariffs 
in the neighborhood of 
2
2
(2 )
2
A
t
γ γ
γ
− −
=
−
, the home firm can not charge the monopoly 
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price, so it charges a price below that and which depends positively on transport cost; 
a decrease in transport costs causes the price and profits of the home firm to decrease; 
consumer surplus and export profit increase but by less than the decline in home 
firm’s profit so that welfare decreases overall. We know this because the derivative of 
the welfare function for when exports are zero is given by 2
(1 )A tγ
γ
− −
 which is 
negative for 
2
2
(2 )
2
A
t
γ γ
γ
− −
=
−
. Thus, in the range of transport costs for the interior 
solution in which two-way trade occurs in equilibrium, welfare is U-shaped just as in 
the case of Brander and Krugman (1983) and minimized at 2 2
min 2 4
 (9 4 )
2(12 9 2 )
N AV γ
γ γ
−
=
− +
.  The 
level of trade cost at which this minimum is attained is: 
2
min 2 4
(1 )(2 ) (3 2 )
12 9 2
v At γ γ γ
γ γ
− + −
=
− +
.  It is easy to show that min
(2 )( ) ( )
2
N V N AV t V γ−> , so 
that welfare attains its global minimum when trade costs are so high that monopoly 
prevails in each market. 
When transport costs are sufficiently high such that trade is eliminated but the 
domestic firm can not charge its single market monopoly price, i.e. for 
2
2
(2 ) (2 )
  t < 
2 2
A Aγ γ γ
γ
− − −≤
−
, the welfare function is decreasing in transport cost.  
So, welfare increases as transport costs decrease because the price of the home firm 
decreases and it’s sale increases since A tq
γ
−
=  and  < 0q t∂ ∂ . Thus, even though 
trade does not occur, reductions in trade costs unambiguously cause welfare to 
improve.  
Brander and Krugman (1983) found that there are always welfare losses from 
reductions in transport cost when transport costs are high. Our result shows that this is 
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true only for the interior solution in which two-way trade occurs. When transport 
costs are sufficiently high so that trade does not occur, reductions in transport costs 
lead to welfare improvement because although it leads to a decrease in profit of the 
domestic firm, the increase in consumer surplus, which arises from increased output, 
more than compensates for the loss in profit. Thus, a reduction in transport cost will 
have a pro-competitive effect as opposed to the result of Brander and Krugman 
(1983). 
When trade costs take the form of tariffs, social welfare under the Nash 
equilibrium is the sum of global profits, consumers’ surplus and tariff revenues, and is 
given by:  
2 2
2
2 2
0
0 2
( ) (2 )
 +  + t x       0  t < 
2 2
    
( ) (2 ) (2 )
 +                   t <  
2 2 2
N
N N
N
N
N
Q A
W
Q A A
γ γ
γ
γ γ γ
γ
 − −∏ ≤
−
= 
− − − ∏ ≤

−
 
where 0 0, Q ,  , , and  xN N N N NQ ∏ ∏  are Nash equilibrium quantities, profits and 
export under the interior and corner solutions respectively. Substituting these into the 
above formula yields the welfare expression: 
2 2 2 2 3 2 2 3 2
2 3 2 2
2
4 (1 )(2 ) (2 ) 2 (1 ) (2 ) (4 8 3 5 ) (2 )
     0  t
2(1 )(4 4 ) 2
( )[ (2 1) ]
                                                                                   
2
N
A At t A
W
A t A t
γ γ γ γ γ γ γ γ γ γ
γ γ γ γ γ
γ
γ
− + − − − + − + − − − −≤ ≤
− + − − −
=
− − + 2
2
    
(2 ) (2 )
   < t  
2 2
A Aγ γ γ
γ




− − − ≤

−
Taking a piecewise derivative of the welfare function with tariffs yields: 
2 3 2 3 2
2 3 2 2
2
2 2
2 (1 ) (2 ) 2 (4 8 3 5 ) (2 )
 < 0             0  t < 
2(1 )(4 4 ) 2
(1 ) (2 ) (2 )
 < 0                                                                  t <  
2 2
N
t
A t A
W
A t A A
γ γ γ γ γ γ γ
γ γ γ γ γ
γ γ γ γ
γ γ
− − + − + − − − −≤
− + − − −
= 
− − − − −≤
−
    




 
Welfare with tariffs is concave and decreasing in tariffs for the entire range of tariffs 
specified and attains its maximum under free trade. Thus, tariff reductions are welfare 
enhancing for all tariff levels.  
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In the limit case of homogenous products, the welfare function is given by 
2 2(1 / 2 )( )A t−  which is also decreasing in t and maximized under free trade; although 
free trade is best for welfare maximization, it is detrimental to firms whose profits are 
driven to zero under the Nash equilibrium.  
It is also important to note that welfare under tariffs and transport costs are 
both decreasing in the degree of product substitutability so that the effects of 
reductions in trade costs would be more profound as goods become more 
substitutable. 
 
Comparison of Welfare under Tariffs and Transport Costs 
 For zero trade costs, both welfare functions are equivalent and given for the 
differentiated products case as: 
2 2 2
2 3 2
2 (2 ) (2 )(0) (0) (4 4 )
N N AW V γ γ
γ γ γ
+ −
= =
+ − −
. For the case of 
homogenous products, both welfare measures are equal to 2 2A . 
 For positive non-prohibitive tariffs for which two-way trade occurs, welfare 
with tariffs is higher than welfare with transport cost because , although tariffs just as 
transport costs, are costs to the firms, they also serve as revenue to the government 
when trade occurs but transport costs are a waste of resources that do not yield any 
additional government revenue. This wasteful effect of transport costs on welfare is 
more profound for distant substitutes since the exports markets become relatively 
more important for firms’ profits and more resources end up being wasted as trade 
occurs.  
For sufficiently high trade costs for which no trade occurs in equilibrium, both 
welfare measures are equal. Specifically, at the prohibitive tariff level, the following 
holds:
2 (4 )( ) ( ) (0) (0)
8
N N N N N NAW t V t V Wγ γ−= = < = . 
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CHAPTER II 
 
THE SUSTAINABILITY OF COLLUSION 
 
The Unconstrained Collusive Outcome 
 The collusive outcome involves both firms agreeing on a pair of prices 
( , )p p for their domestic and foreign markets respectively in order to maximize global 
collusive profits; then, depending on the threshold level of tariff under this outcome, 
both firms decide whether to supply positive or zero exports.  
The collusive price pair has to be such that the discounted profits from 
colluding in every period given those prices is no less than the sum of deviation 
profit—should any firm deviate from the collusive outcome—and the continuation 
punishment profit after deviation. Thus, the incentive compatibility constraint for a 
given trade cost 0t ≥ and discount factor 0 1δ< < is:  
( , , ) (1 ) ( , , )  ( )C D Pp p t p p t tδ δΠ ≥ − Π + Π  
where ( , , ),  ( , , ),  and ( )C D Pp p t p p t tΠ Π Π  are the collusive (agreement), deviation 
and punishment profits respectively. We assume grim trigger strategies for the 
punishment phase so that the punishment payoff above would be the same as the Nash 
payoff. We also assume that renegotiation costs3 are prohibitively high, so that once 
firms have successfully decided on the collusive outcome and punishment payoffs, 
they do not meet to renegotiate the punishment payoff in the event that a firm 
deviates.  The Nash payoff remains the punishment payoff in every period after 
deviation. 
                                                
3
 These include, but are not limited to, sanctions, fines and penalties that firms would face if caught 
negotiating prices since such negotiations are prohibited by law.  
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The threshold level of trade cost after which firms switch to zero exports is 
given as (1 )Ct A γ= − . This cutoff level of trade cost is less than that under the Nash 
equilibrium. However, as 0γ → , the cutoff levels of trade costs under the Nash 
equilibrium and collusive outcome converge.  
The following proposition establishes the collusive profit for the firms given 
this cutoff level of trade cost. 
Proposition 4 
The global collusive profit given the cutoff level of trade cost (1 )Ct A γ= −  
is:  
2 2
2
2
 ,    0   t (1 )
2(1 ) 2(1 ) 4(1 )( )
                                         ,      t > (1 )
4
C
A At t A
t
A A
γ
γ γ γ
γ

− + ≤ ≤ −
+ + −∏ = 

−

     (2) 
Proof: 
Given the collusive price pair ( , )p p , global collusive profits are: 
( ) ( )( ),     0  t < (1 )( , , ) ( )                                                t  (1 )
C a bp dp p p t a bp dp Ap p t
A p p A
γ
γ
− + + − − + ≤ −∏ = 
− ≥ −
 
Solving the optimization problem yields the collusive prices 
          
/ 2Cp A=
 and 2
C A tp +=
 
Substituting these prices into the expressions for global collusive profits yield the 
profit functions for the given collusive prices.  
 
 The collusive profit is decreasing in trade cost for 0 (1 )t A γ≤ < −  and 
constant for trade costs equal to or exceeding the prohibitive level. It is also important 
to note that 
2 2
( 0 ) ( )
2 (1 ) 4
C C CA At
γ
∏ = > ∏ =
+
so that the collusive profit in the 
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neighborhood of free trade is higher than that which is obtainable when trade costs are 
prohibitive or the single market monopoly profits when exports are zero.   
The intuition behind this result is that, to the extent that goods are 
differentiated, every market matters for firms’ global profits which are maximized 
only under free trade. As trade costs become prohibitive, the maximum profit any 
firm can get is the monopoly profit from its domestic market since the rival firm is 
completely driven out of the market.   
But when goods are homogenous, the global collusive profits are the same 
under free trade as is when trade costs are prohibitive. On the other hand, when goods 
are independent, firms can price independently without any need to collude as each 
firm becomes a localized monopoly in its own product and captures the monopoly 
profits in all markets.  
 
Deviation Profits 
 If a firm decides to deviate from the collusive outcome, it does so by lowering 
its price. The deviation payoffs are obtained by applying the reaction functions to the 
cartel prices derived in the previous section.  The incentive to deviate is higher for 
close substitutes than for distant substitutes since the deviating firm will capture a 
larger market share when goods are closely substitutable than when they are not.  
A deviating firm decides what its optimal deviation strategy should be in each 
market (deviation to an interior solution or deviation to a corner) given the level of 
trade cost and collusive price of its rival in that market. From the reaction function of 
the home firm in the home market, the threshold level of trade cost after which it 
deviates to a corner is 
2
0 2
(2 2 )
2
dh At γ γ
γ
− −
=
−
and for  00  t < dht≤  deviation involves setting 
a price that allows positive export in the home market. On the other hand, for low 
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levels of trade costs satisfying 2( 2 2 )0  t < 
2
A γ γ
γ
− +≤ , deviation of the home firm in the 
foreign market involves setting a price to capture the entire market. Thus, the 
threshold level of trade cost after which the home firm deviates to an interior in the 
foreign market is 
2( 2 2 )
2
df
i
A
t
γ γ
γ
− +
= . The corresponding deviation profits for the 
home and foreign markets respectively are: 
2 2
2 2
2
2 2
2
[ ( 2 ) ] (2 2 )
 ,              0   t <  
1 6(1 ) 2
( )[ (2 1) ] ( 2 2 )( )  ,        t <  (1 )
4 2
                                   t  A (1 - )
4
D
h
A t A
A t A t A
t A
A
γ γ γ γ
γ γ
γ γ γ γ
γ γ
γ

− + − −≤
− −

− − + − −∏ = ≤ −
−

 ≥

 
2 2
2
2 2
2
( 2 1) 2 ( 2 2 )
 ,        0   t <  
24
[ (2 ) 2 ] ( 2 2 ) (2 )( )  ,           t <  
2 216(1 )
( 2 )0                                     t
2
D
f
A A t A
A t A A
t
A
γ γ γ γ
γγ
γ γ γ γ
γγ
γ

− − − +≤


− − − + −∏ = ≤
−

−≥

 (3) 
The profit from deviating to an interior solution in the home market is strictly 
increasing in t whereas it is concave in t for deviation to a corner solution and 
maximized at (1 )t A γ= − . The deviation profits in the foreign market are decreasing in 
the trade cost for the ranges specified for which the home firm deviates to a corner or 
an interior solution. The prohibitive level of trade cost that prevents deviation from 
the collusive outcome in the domestic market is (1 )Dht A γ= −  which is less than the 
prohibitive level of trade cost that prevents deviation in the export market 
(2 )
2
D
f
A
t
γ−
=
.  
 For sufficiently high levels of γ , only a corner deviation is possible in the 
home market whereas in the foreign market, corner deviation occurs only for low 
values of t  but for high values of t , interior deviation will occur. On the other hand, 
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for sufficiently low levels of γ , only an interior deviation is possible in the foreign 
market whereas in the home market, interior deviation occurs only for low values of t  
but for high values of t , a corner deviation will occur. Thus, although the total 
deviation profits depends on the levels of t and γ , in the neighborhood of free trade, 
the deviation profits corresponding to low and high levels of γ respectively are 
2 2 2 2 2
2
2 ( 2 ) 2 (4 4 ) (4 )( )
16 (1 )
D
l
A A t t
tγ
γ γ γ γ
γ
− − − + + +∏ =
−
 
2 2
2
(2 2 )(2 1)( )
4
D
h
A At t
tγ
γ
γ
− − −∏ =  
The following proposition captures the results on deviation payoffs. 
 
Proposition 5 
The deviation payoffs in the domestic and export markets and corresponding 
deviation profits for low and high degree of substitutability between export and 
domestic output in the neighborhood of free trade are given by: 
2 2
2 2
2
2 2
2
[ ( 2 ) ] (2 2 )
 ,              0   t <  
1 6(1 ) 2
( )[ (2 1) ] ( 2 2 )( )  ,        t <  (1 )
4 2
                                   t  A (1 - )
4
D
h
A t A
A t A t A
t A
A
γ γ γ γ
γ γ
γ γ γ γ
γ γ
γ

− + − −≤
− −

− − + − −∏ = ≤ −
−

 ≥

 
2 2
2
2 2
2
( 2 1) 2 ( 2 2 )
 ,        0   t <  
24
[ ( 2 ) 2 ] ( 2 2 ) (2 )( )  ,           t <  
2 21 6(1 )
(2 )0                                     t
2
D
f
A A t A
A t A A
t
A
γ γ γ γ
γγ
γ γ γ γ
γγ
γ

− − − +≤


− − − + −∏ = ≤
−

−≥

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2 2 2 2 2
2
2 (2 ) 2 ( 4 4 ) (4 )( )
1 6 (1 )
D
l
A A t t
tγ
γ γ γ γ
γ
− − − + + +∏ =
−
 
2 2
2
(2 2 )(2 1)( )
4
D
h
A At t
tγ
γ
γ
− − −∏ =  
Proof:  
Already presented in the previous section.  
 
Sustainability of the Collusive Outcome 
 I assume that both firms revert to the one-shot Bertrand Nash equilibrium 
forever after in case any firm deviates from the collusive outcome and under the 
assumption that both firms have the same discount factor (0,1)δ∈ , the incentive 
compatibility constraint for which the collusive outcome is sustainable in all periods 
of the repeated game is given as: ( , , ) (1 ) ( , , )C D Np p t p p tδ δ∏ ≥ − ∏ + ∏  
where the profit functions are as defined in the previous section. The minimum 
discount factor for which this holds is given by ( , ) C DN Dtδ γ
∏ − ∏
=
∏ − ∏
, which depends on the 
level of trade cost and the degree of product substitutability.  
 I find that there is a non-monotonic relationship between the minimum 
discount factor and trade cost which is strongly influenced by the degree of product 
substitutability. In the limit case of homogenous products, the corresponding Nash, 
collusive and deviation profits are given respectively by 1 ( )N t A tγ =∏ = − , 
2
1 4
C A
γ =∏ =  and 
1
( )
2
D A A t
γ =
−∏ =
. The minimum discount factor for which collusion is sustainable is thus: 
(1, )
2( )
A
t
A t
δ =
−
.   
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This discount factor is increasing in trade costs, minimized under free trade at  
0.5—a familiar textbook result for the minimum discount factor required for collusion 
to be sustainable in a homogenous goods duopoly market in which firms compete in 
prices—and maximized under the prohibitive level of trade cost.  
This result suggests that collusion is easier to sustain for lower trade costs than 
for higher trade costs. This is because the punishment payoff is increasing in trade 
costs and maximized at the prohibitive level. As the punishment payoff increases, the 
incentive compatibility constraint becomes more difficult to satisfy and the possibility 
of a breakdown in the collusive outcome increases. Thus, reductions in trade costs 
make the collusive outcome more sustainable by increasing the collusive payoff and 
reducing the punishment payoff.   
This result was also derived by Lommerud and SØrgard (2001), who found 
that when collusion is supported by grim trigger strategies, the short term gain from 
deviation is lower than the long term loss in continuation profits so that collusion 
becomes easier to sustain when trade is liberalized.  
When goods are independent, the Nash, collusive and deviation profits are all 
equal so that a firm can price as a monopoly without any need for collusion.   
Bond and Syropoulos (2008), in the case of quantity competition in 
homogenous products, found that the minimum discount factor for which the 
collusive outcome is sustainable is a decreasing function of t  for (0, ]
2
A
t ∈ , so that 
reduction in trade costs in this range will make the collusive outcome less sustainable. 
They also find that there is a sense in which trade liberalization may facilitate the 
collusive outcome when trade costs are already low. They generate this latter result 
from the strict convexity of deviation profits for allocations of domestic and foreign 
outputs that satisfy the monopoly outcome at 0t = . At 0t = , the minimum discount 
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factor will be attained by equalizing domestic and foreign output levels and this cross-
hauling of goods facilitates collusion by leading to lower deviation profits. 
Although this result derived for 0t =  and homogenous products are the same 
for the case of price competition and quantity competition, it is important to point out 
the discontinuity of the minimum discount factor at 0t =  for the case of Cournot 
competition whereas there is no discontinuity for the Bertrand competition. Moreover, 
the collusion enforcing effect of trade liberalization at 0t =  in the Cournot case arises 
only for equal market shares, marking a difference between the Cournot and Bertrand 
competition. 
 The result generated for the limiting case of the Bertrand competition for 
0t > is different from that of the Cournot and it is not surprising because one would 
generally expect the opposite of the Cournot result since whereas quantities are 
strategic substitutes in oligopolistic markets, prices are strategic complements. For 
strategic substitutes, a firm’s best response function is decreasing in its rival’s output 
choice whereas for strategic complements, it is increasing in its rival’s price choice.  
For Bertrand competition, when firms are symmetric with the same marginal 
cost of production, and trade costs are sufficiently low so that firms can export, the 
domestic firm has a competitive advantage over the foreign firm in the domestic 
market and can always slightly undercut the price of the foreign firm and capture a 
significantly large percentage of the market if not the entire market.  For the Cournot 
case, a firm can hardly capture the entire market even when it deviates from the 
collusive outcome; moreover, the punishment payoff is never driven to zero. 
However, for the case of differentiated products Bertrand competition, we will 
see that the result that trade liberalization makes the collusive outcome more difficult 
to sustain, as derived for the homogenous product Cournot competition, is obtained 
  
 
23 
 
 
for some intermediate degrees of product substitutability and trade costs sufficiently 
low enough.  
We will demonstrate that the minimum discount factor is non-monotonic in 
the trade cost and the degree of substitutability and to determine how trade 
liberalization affects the minimum discount factor, and hence collusion for (0,1)γ ∈ , 
the following inequality regarding the cut-off trade costs for which the firm switches 
between outcomes for the different “regimes” (Nash, collusive and deviation 
respectively) will be useful: 
0 0
dh c n n
m mt t t t< < <         (4) 
where the superscripts denote the regimes and the subscripts denote the outcomes; for 
example 0
dht is the cutoff trade cost for which a deviating firm chooses a corner 
outcome in its home market, 0
nt is the cutoff trade cost for which a firm switches from 
an interior to a corner under the Nash equilibrium and nmt is the cutoff trade cost for 
which a firm finds choosing the monopoly outcome optimal under the Nash 
equilibrium. As is observable from the previous section, the levels of trade costs are 
given by: 
 
2
0 2
(2 2 )
2
dh At γ γ
γ
− −
=
−
, (1 )cmt A γ= − , 
2
0 2
(2 )
2
n At γ γ
γ
− −
=
−
, 
(2 )
2
n
m
A
t
γ−
= ; 
 and it is straightforward to show that the inequality above actually holds. All four 
levels of trade costs are decreasing in γ . There is however a fifth level of trade cost 
for which the firm switches from a corner to an interior in the foreign market. This 
level of trade cost is given by 
2( 2 2 )
2
df
i
A
t
γ γ
γ
− +
=  and is increasing in γ . As a result, 
its position in the above inequality (4) will depend on the value of γ . The diagram 
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below presents all five levels of trade costs as functions on γ  for a given value of 
A=1. 
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
γ
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
t
t0
dh
t
m
c
t 0
n
t m
n
t
i
df
 
Fig. 2 Cutoff Tariffs as Functions of the Degree of Product Substitutability. 
 
The values of γ  for which the trade cost functions intersect are given by: 
0
df dh
it t=  at 0.73
dγ = , df ci mt t=  at 0.82cγ = , 0df nit t=  at 0 0.87nγ = , df ni mt t=  at 
1nmγ = . These values will be useful for determination of the minimum discount factor 
in different ranges of γ .  The ranges to be considered are: 
{(0,0.73),[0.73,0.82),[0.82,0.87),[0.87,1)}γ ∈ .  We will take a value of γ  from each 
of the ranges specified above and illustrate the minimum discount factor for each 
value.  
For 0γ = , there is no need for collusion since products are independent and 
each firm sets the monopoly price in each market even in the Nash equilibrium. Thus, 
consideration of the minimum discount factor breaks down.  
For (0,1)γ ∈ , although the expressions for the minimum discount factors are 
complex and as such not presented in the paper, graphical representations of the 
minimum discount factor with respect to trade costs are presented below for specific 
values of 0.1γ ≥ . Graphs are not presented for {0.3,0.4}γ ∈  because the shape of the 
minimum discount factor is similar to that of 0.2γ = .   
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Fig. 3 Minimum Discount Factor and Trade Costs for 0.1γ =  
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Fig. 4 Minimum Discount Factor and Trade Costs for 0.2γ =  
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Fig. 5 Minimum Discount Factor and Trade Costs for 0.5γ =  
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Fig. 6 Minimum Discount Factor and Trade Costs for 0.6γ =  
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Fig. 7 Minimum Discount Factor and Trade Costs for 0.7γ =  
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Fig. 8 Minimum Discount Factor and Trade Costs for 0.8γ =  
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Fig. 9 Minimum Discount Factor and Trade Costs for 0.9γ =  
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Fig. 10 Minimum Discount Factor and Trade Costs for 1γ =  
 
Although the minimum discount factor exhibits a non-monotonic relationship 
with trade costs for 0 1γ< < , the following general conclusions can be made: 
• For 0.5γ < , the minimum discount factor is increasing in trade costs for trade 
costs in the low to intermediate ranges. Thus, when products are distant substitutes 
and trade costs are not so high, trade liberalization will make the collusive 
outcome more sustainable just as in the case of homogenous products.   
• For 0.6γ < , the minimum discount factor is convex in trade costs for sufficiently 
high trade costs especially in the neighborhood of the prohibitive level of trade 
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cost. In such a case, trade liberalization will have either a pro-competitive or pro-
collusive effect depending on the initial level of trade cost. 
• For 0.7 0.9γ< ≤ , the minimum discount factor is decreasing in trade costs for 
sufficiently low levels of trade costs and especially in the neighborhood of free 
trade. Thus, in this range of γ  and trade costs, trade liberalization will make the 
collusive outcome more difficult to sustain and therefore have pro-competitive 
effects. 
We have thus demonstrated clearly that the minimum discount factor may be 
decreasing or increasing with respect to trade costs and shown that the effect of trade 
liberalization on collusion and hence welfare is not so clear cut—it depends on the 
degree to which products are substitutable or differentiable and the prevailing levels 
of trade costs in the markets. 
The case of homogenous products has already been treated in the literature 
(Lommerud and Sorgard (2001) for example) and touched on also in this paper and in 
that case, we saw that the minimum discount factor is an increasing function of trade 
costs.  We also saw that this result is not only true for homogenous products but for 
all 0.5γ <  and sufficiently low trade costs.  
 
Limit Case of Homogenous Products and More Than 1 Firm in Each Country 
Suppose there are n>1 firms in each country. For 0t = , domestic firms have no 
cost advantages over foreign firms; the Nash equilibrium will involve all firms 
charging 0p =  and each supplying 2q A n= . This combination of price and output 
yields zero profit for each firm.  Domestic output level will equals A  and welfare 
equals 2 2A .  
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For 0t > , the Nash equilibrium involves all foreign firms charging *p t= in 
the domestic market and supplying zero exports while all domestic firms charge 
0p =  and each supply q A n= . Each firm still earns zero profit and welfare 
equals 2 2A .Social welfare in this case is higher compared to when there is one firm 
in each market. Regardless of the levels of trade costs, having more than one firm in 
each market is pro-competitive and welfare is higher because the increase in 
consumers’ surplus as a result of increased output outweighs the decrease in firms’ 
profits as they compete away their profits to zero.  
Collusion may involve firms within and across countries. For trade costs equal 
to or beyond the prohibitive level 2A , collusion necessarily involves firms within a 
country (intra-national). In this case, each domestic firm charges the monopoly 
price 2A and supplies 2q A n= . Each firm’s profit is 2 4A n which is decreasing in 
the number of firms. Welfare equals 23 8A . Thus, welfare under collusion is 
unchanged when compared to the case of one firm in each country. The effect of more 
firms in each country is only a reduction in the collusive profit of each firm. The 
minimum discount factor for which the collusive outcome is sustainable is equal 
to ( 1)n n− , which is increasing in n and highlights the sense in which increasing the 
number of firms in the domestic market can be pro-competitive when trade costs are 
sufficiently high. 
For   (0, 2)t A∈ , intra-national collusion involves each of the foreign firms 
charging *p t=  and supplying zero exports whereas the domestic firms each set 
p t=  and supply ( )q A t n= − , thereby earning profits ( )t A t n− . As with the 
previous case, welfare is the same as when there is only one firm in each market, 
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2 2( ) 2A t− , and the minimum discount factor is ( 1)n n− , which is independent of 
trade costs. 
On the other hand, international collusion involves all firms charging the 
monopoly price and each supplying 2q A n= in its domestic market. This yields 
collusive profits of 2 4A n  which is higher than the profit level under intra-national 
collusion. The minimum discount factor for which the former is sustainable is 
1
2 ( )
A
n A t
−
−
 which is increasing in n, decreasing in t and maximized under free trade 
at (2 1) 2n n− . Although the result still remains that increasing the number of firms in 
each country is pro-competitive in the neighborhood of 0t = , it is no longer the case 
that trade liberalization makes the collusive outcome more sustainable for 0t > as is 
the case with one firm in each country. This is because the punishment pay-off for a 
deviating firm is zero and independent of the level of trade cost in its domestic market 
(same as in the foreign market) when there is more than one firm in each country 
whereas its punishment payoff in its domestic market is increasing in t for 
  (0, 2)t A∈  and maximized at the prohibitive trade cost. Thus, a reduction in trade 
cost reduces the punishment payoff (or alternatively, increases the strength of the 
retaliatory payoff) for the case of one firm in each country. While a reduction in the 
trade cost has no effect on the punishment payoff when there is more than one firm in 
each country, the payoff from deviating in the export market is decreasing in t so that 
a reduction in trade cost increases this payoff and makes deviation more attractable.  
Moreover, the minimum discount factor for international collusion is higher 
than what is necessary to sustain intra-national collusion so that although profits are 
higher under international collusion, intra-national collusion is more sustainable. 
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Thus, there is a trade-off between cartel sustainability and profitability when there is 
more than one firm in each country.  
 
Optimization Subject to Incentive Compatibility Constraint 
For a given 0t ≥ , an agreement ( ,  )p p  is sustainable if 
( , , , , ( )) ( , , ) (1 ) ( , , )  ( ) 0N C D NZ p p t t p p t p p t tδ δ δΠ = Π − − Π − Π ≥   
where the collusive (agreement), deviation and Nash profits are given in previous 
sections. 
The deviation profits depend on the degree of product substitutability and the 
levels of trade costs because these two determine whether the firm deviates to an 
interior or corner outcome in the domestic and foreign markets respectively. 
Specifically, for very low levels of γ  like 0.2γ = , only an interior deviation is 
possible in the foreign market whereas, in the domestic market, both interior and 
corner deviations are possible depending on the levels of trade costs. For low levels of 
the trade cost, as in the neighborhood of free trade, deviation in the domestic market 
is interior but for sufficiently high levels of trade cost, it is a corner. 
On the other hand, for sufficiently high levels of  γ  like 0.9γ = , only a corner 
deviation is possible in the domestic market whereas, in the foreign market, both 
interior and corner deviations are possible depending on the levels of trade costs. For 
low levels of the trade cost, as in the neighborhood of free trade, deviation in the 
foreign market is corner but for sufficiently high levels of trade cost, it is interior. 
Thus, for sufficiently low levels ofγ , we have the home and foreign market 
deviation profits given respectively as: 
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2 2
2
2
2 2
(  ) ( 2 2 )
 ,                        0   t <
4 2( )
( )[ ( 1) ] ( 2 2 )
 ,        t  <  (1 )
2
D
h
a d p A
b
p
A p A p A A
γ γ
γ
γ γ γ γ
γ γ
 + − −≤
−∏ = 
− − + − − ≤ −
−
 
    
2( ) ( 2 )( , )  ,          0   t <  
4 2
D
f
a d p b t Ap t
b
γ + − −∏ = ≤

 
For sufficiently high levels ofγ , we have the home and foreign market 
deviation profits given respectively as: 
            2
( )[ ( 1) ]( )  ,          0  t < (1 )Dh
A p A pp Aγ γ
γ

− − +∏ = ≤ −

 
2
2
2 2
( )[ ( 1) ] ( 2 2 )
 ,           0   t <
2( , )
( ) ( 2 2 ) ( 2 )
 ,                             t <  
4 2 2
D
f
A p A t p A
p t
a dp b t A A
b
γ γ γ γ
γγ
γ γ γ
γ

− − − + − +≤
∏ = 
+ − − + − ≤

 
From the above, we can see that all outcomes are interior for very low levels of γ  and 
for trade costs in the range
2
2
(2 2 )0  t < 
2
A γ γ
γ
− −≤
−
, so that total deviation profit is given as: 
2 2 2
2
(  ) (  ) ( 2 2 )( , , )  ,        0   t <
4 2
D a d p a d p b t Ap p t
b
γ γ
γ
 + + + − − −∏ = ≤
−
 
This deviation profit is decreasing in t and also strictly increasing and convex 
in ( , )p p . But for sufficiently high levels of γ  and for trade costs in the 
range 0  t< (1 )A γ≤ − , the Nash and collusive outcomes are interior whereas the deviation 
outcomes are both corners. In this case, total deviation profit is given as: 
2
( ) [ ( 1) ] ( )[ ( 1) ]( , , )  ,          0  t < (1 )D A p A p A p A t pp p t Aγ γ γ γ
γ

− − + + − − − +∏ = ≤ −

which is decreasing in t and strictly concave in ( , )p p .  
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For very low levels of  γ  and 
2
2
(2 2 )0  t
2
A γ γ
γ
− −≤ ≤
−
, the agreement profit is 
strictly concave in  ( , )p p , so that the constraint  
( , , , , ( )) ( , , ) (1 ) ( , , )  ( )N C D NZ p p t t p p t p p t tδ δ δΠ = Π − − Π − Π  is also concave in 
( , )p p  since the deviation profit is convex in ( , )p p . For sufficiently high levels of  γ  
and 0  t < A(1- )γ≤ , the agreement profit is strictly concave in  ( , )p p , but the deviation 
profit is concave in ( , )p p  so that the constraint is the sum of a concave and convex 
set and as such, we cannot say much about the curvature of the constraint but we 
know at least that the constraint is a convex set because if we take any two points in 
the set, a linear combination of those two points also lie in the set. 
 For optimization subject to the incentive constraint, if we focus on the case of 
all interior outcomes and maximize the concave agreement profit subject to the 
concave constraint, we have the following: 
,
 L= ( , , ) [ ( , , ) (1 ) ( , , )  ( )]A A D N
p p
Max p p t p p t p p t tλ δ δΠ + Π − − Π − Π  
Denoting with subscript the derivative of the Langragian with respect to a variable, 
we have: 
 L = (1+ ) (1 ) 0C Dp p pλ λ δΠ − − Π =               (5) 
  L = (1+ ) (1 ) 0C Dp p pλ λ δΠ − − Π =                 (6) 
 L = (1 )  0C D Nλ δ δΠ − − Π − Π ≥                 (7) 
 L = ( (1 )  ) 0,      0C D Nλλ λ δ δ λΠ − − Π − Π = ≥               (8) 
When the incentive constraint is slack, i.e. holds with inequality, from (8), we have 
that 0λ = , and from (5) and (6), the solution to the constrained optimization problem 
is the same as that of  the unconstrained problem; 
2
Ap =  and 
2
A tp += , and since  
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( , , , , ( ))NZ p p t tδ Π is concave in ( , )p p , we know that ( , )p p is sustainable for any 
minδ δ≥ , where minδ  the minimum discount factor consistent with low values of t  and 
γ  have already been computed.  
For 0λ > , the incentive constraint binds and the monopoly outcome may no 
longer be sustainable as the collusive outcome as was the case when the incentive 
constraint was slack. From (5) and (6), we have that: 
(1 ) 2  2 2 2
1  
C C
p p
D D
p p
a d p bp dt a dp bp bt
a dp bt a d p
λ δ
λ
Π Π
− + − − + − +
= = ⇒ =
+ Π Π + − +
   (9) 
For 0t = , this reduces to 2  2 2 2
 
a d p bp a dp bp
a dp a d p
+ − + −
=
+ +
, so that p p= .   For interior 
optima, the first order condition is necessary but not sufficient.  With only one 
binding constraint and two choice variables, the sign of the determinant of the 3x3 
matrix of bordered second order conditions should be positive for ( , )p p  to be an 
interior optimum.   
From (9), we derive that the marginal rate of substitution between p  and p  
along the agreement and deviation profit curves must be equal; i.e.  
,
C D
p p
p p C D
p p
MRS
∏ ∏
= =∏ ∏ . The derivatives of the deviation and agreement profits are 
given as: 2( )A p a b d pΠ = − +  and 2
( )
8
D
p
d a dp
b
+Π = . From (9) and 
letting1 ;   (1 )λ θ λ δ β+ = − = , we have 
2 3
2 2 2 3
8 (1 )(8 )
16 ( ) (1 )(16
ab ad Ap p
b b d d
β θ γ β γθ γ θ
β θ γ β γ θ γ θ
− − − +
= = =
+ + + + −
, which when substituted into 
the marginal rate of substitution gives 
,
1p pMRS = .  
  
 
35 
 
 
We conjecture that p p=  everywhere, and to test this, we need to verify that 
the sufficient condition holds. To do this, we check the determinant of the 3x3 matrix 
of bordered second order derivatives: 
(1 ) (1 )       (1 ) (1 )      (1 )   
(1 ) (1 )       (1 ) (1 )      (1 )  
(1 )                      (1 )                     0     
C D C D C D
pp pp pp pp p p
C D C D C D
pp pp pp pp p p
C D C D
p p p p
λ λ δ λ λ δ δ
λ λ δ λ λ δ δ
δ δ
+ Π − − Π + Π − − Π Π − − Π
+ Π − − Π + Π − − Π Π − − Π
Π − − Π Π − − Π                  
 
 
 
 
  
 
Substituting  2Cp a d p bpΠ = + − , 2
( )
8
D
p
d a dp
b
+Π = ,  2Cp a d p bpΠ = + − , 
2
( )
8
D
p
d a dp
b
+Π = , 2C Cpp pp bΠ = Π = − , 
2
28
D D
pp pp
d
b
Π = Π = , and 2C Cpp pp dΠ = Π = ,  
0D Dpp ppΠ = Π =  and the value p p=  above into the above matrix gives a determinant  
A2 γ2Hβ H−1+γL γ2 − 16θL Hβ2H−1+γL H1+ γL H2+ 3γL+ 24β H−1+ θL− 2H−1+ γL H1+ γL H−1+θL θL2
4H−1+γL H1+ γL4 H−1+ θL2H−16β + H−1+ γL γ2θL2
 
which is positive .  Thus, the sufficient condition holds. 
The above prices are less than the monopoly prices under free trade when the 
incentive constraint is slack. We know this because when the incentive constraint is 
slack and trade is free, then the collusive outcome is 
2
Ap p= =  but here the price 
pair we’ve derived for binding incentive constraint is less than the monopoly price 
since 1 1
1
γ
γ
−
<
+
 and 
3
2 3
8 1
16 2
β γθ γ θ
β γ θ γ θ
− +
<
+ −
. Thus, the maximum sustainable collusive 
profit for the case of binding incentive constraint under free trade is less than the 
monopoly profit. Since the deviation profits are increasing in the other firm’s choice 
of monopoly prices, a reduction in prices below the monopoly price will reduce 
deviation incentives as is the case here. Thus, when trade costs are sufficiently low, as 
in the neighborhood of free trade, further reduction in trade costs reduces the 
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deviation incentives and hence makes the collusive outcome more sustainable when 
the incentive constraint binds.  
For 0t > , any price pair satisfying (9) is sustainable; we do not focus on 
determining the prices here. Our interest is on whether a reduction in the discount 
factor would cause trade to occur from a situation where trade did not initially occur.  
We know that since the constraint is monotone inδ , there exists δ  for which the 
constraint just binds. We also know that the pair of prices chosen by the cartel is 
increasing inδ . The question that we then want to answer is: supposing we start from 
sufficiently high trade costs so that trade does not occur, will a decrease in δ  which 
leads to a decrease in the collusive price cause firms to trade? To answer this 
question, we will consider how a decline in δ  will affect the marginal rate of 
substitution along the agreement and deviation profits curve for the interior solution. 
If the marginal rates of substitution are equal, the firms will not trade; otherwise, trade 
will occur.  
The marginal rate of substitution of the cartel profit for an interior solution 
is:
,
2 2  
2 2
A
p p
a bp d p dtMRS
a bp dp bt
− + −
=
− + +
 and that of the deviation profit is 
,
 
D
p p
a dp btMRS
a d p
+ −
=
+
. If we evaluate these marginal rate of substitution at the 
boundary price bp t= , we get : 
,
(1 ) 2
(1 ) 2
A
p p
A t pMRS
A t p
γ γ
γ γ
− + −
=
− − +
 and 
,
(1 )
(1 )
D
p p
A t pMRS
A t
γ γ
γ γ
− − +
=
− +
.  
The former is increasing in p whereas the latter is decreasing in p. Since the marginal 
rates of substitution evaluated at the boundary are not equal, the firms will do better 
by trading.  Thus, a reduction in the minimum discount factor will lead to trade. 
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When we compare these marginal rates of substitution along the interval [ , ]N cp p , 
where cp is the unconstrained domestic market price for the cartel, which is the same 
as the monopoly price, we get that:  
2 2
, 2 2
(2 ) (2 )[ ,     ]( 1)(2 ) (4 3 )
A
p p
A tMRS
A t
γ γ γ γ γγ
γ γ γ
− − − −
∈ −
− + + −
 
and 
2 2
, 2
2 (2 ) 2 (2 ) (2 ) 2[ ,      ]( (1 ) )(4 ) 2 (1 ) 2
D
p p
A t A tMRS
A t A t
γ γ γ γ
γ γ γ γ γ
− − − − − −
∈
− + − − +
. 
Finally, if we keep trade costs constant and reduce δ  so that the collusive 
price reduces, we see that the marginal rate of substitution of the cartel profit along 
the boundary will increase whereas the marginal rate of substitution of the deviation 
profit along the boundary will decrease. In this fashion, further declines in δ  which 
causes the above movements in the marginal rates of substitution will ensure that 
there exist a ( , )N cp p p∈ for which the firms can’t do better by trading, and this price 
will be the equilibrium price. 
 
Welfare Effects of  Tariff Reductions under the Collusive Outcome 
When trade costs assume the form of tariffs, social welfare can be expressed 
as the sum of consumer surplus, global profits and tariff revenues when exports are 
positive. The expression is thus given by: 
 2  1( ) ( )  ( )
2
C C C CW Q t t x t= +∏ +
 where C C CQ q x= + ,  C C Cq a bp d p= − + ,  C C Cx a bp dp= − + , 
1
A
a
γ
=
+
,  
2
1
1
b
γ
=
−
, and  21
d γ
γ
=
−
, 
CW
 is the national welfare function under collusion, CQ  is the 
aggregate output level under collusion, CΠ  is the firm’s profit under collusion, Cq  and 
Cx
 are domestic firm’s output and exports under collusion respectively. Recall from 
previous calculations that 
2 2
 
2
2 (1 ) 2  (1 )( )
4(1 )
C A At tt γ γ
γ
− − − +∏ =
−
, 2
(1 )
2(1 )
C A tq γ γ
γ
− +
=
−
, 2
(1 )
2(1 )
C A tx γ
γ
− −
=
−
 and  
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(2 )
2(1 )
C C C A tQ q x
γ
−
= + =
+
. Thus, 
2 2 2
2 2
1 (2 ) 2 (1 ) 2 (1 ) (1 )
2 2(1 ) 4(1 ) 2(1 )
C A t A At t A tW tγ γ γ
γ γ γ
  − − − − + − −
= + +   +
− −    
 
2 2
2
4 ( 1)(2 ) 4 ( 1) (1 3 )
8(1 ) ( 1)
C A At tW γ γ γ γ
γ γ
− + − − + +
⇒ =
+ −
 
2
4 (1 ) 2 (3 1) 0
 8 ( 1)(1 )
CW A t
t
γ γ
γ γ
∂ − + +
⇒ = <
∂
− +
. 
 
 Thus, a tariff reduction unambiguously improves social welfare because it 
leads to an increase in aggregate output and therefore an increase in consumer surplus. 
Although there is a non-monotonic relationship between global collusive profits and 
tariffs when firms choose to export, the overall effect of a tariff reduction on social 
welfare is positive because of its effect on consumer surplus and tariff revenues. 
Again recall that Bond and Syropoulos (2008) noted that trade liberalization will lead 
to an improvement in domestic welfare if and only if it results in a reduction in the 
domestic price and that is the case here. The result obtained here is not surprising 
because the price charged by the domestic firm in the home market is independent of 
the tariff when firms collude but that of the foreign firm is an increasing function of 
the tariff. Thus, a tariff reduction ultimately reduces the relative price faced by 
domestic consumers and increases the purchasing power of their disposable income.  
 When firms collude under zero exports, tariff revenues are zero, so that the 
welfare function is the sum of consumer surplus and the single market monopoly 
profit. Thus, welfare is given as:  2  1( )2
C C CW Q= +∏
 where 2
C C AQ q= =
 and
2
 
4
C A∏ = , 
implying that 
2
 
3
8
C AW = a function that is independent of tariffs. Thus, trade 
liberalization has welfare-enhancing effects only when firms choose to export and 
then collude (collusive exporting). 
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Conclusion 
I study the effect of reductions in trade costs on the sustainability of collusion 
and social welfare in a duopoly market in which firms compete in prices and find that 
the relationship between trade costs and the minimum discount factor for which the 
collusive outcome is sustainable may be positive or negative, and this relationship 
depends, to a great extent, on the degree of product substitutability and the initial 
levels of trade costs.  
For the limiting case of homogenous products, I find that a reduction in trade 
cost makes the collusive outcome more sustainable. This is because although trade 
liberalization makes deviation in the export market more attractive, it also makes 
punishment after deviation harsher. In the case of price competition, the loss in future 
profits as a result of the harsher punishment is more than the one-period gain from 
deviation. Hence the collusion-enhancing effect of trade liberalization as is found 
here.4 
 I also find that the optimal cartel agreements when trade is free and the 
incentive constraint binds involves firms charging a price less than the monopoly 
price in each market in order to facilitate collusion. 
I also considered the effect of tariffs and transport costs on social welfare and 
find that reductions in tariffs unambiguously lead to improvements in social welfare, 
whereas reductions in transport costs may or may not lead to welfare improvements. 
In particular, when exports are positive in equilibrium, welfare is U-shaped; for 
sufficiently low levels of transport costs, further reductions in transport costs are 
welfare- enhancing but when transport costs are sufficiently high, reductions in 
transport costs are welfare-reducing.  
                                                
4
 The opposite result is found for the case of quantity competition because in that case, firms engage in 
cross-hauling of identical products even under the punishment phase, whereas in the case of price 
competition, no cross-hauling of identical products occur under collusion or punishment. 
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When transport costs are prohibitively high enough to warrant zero exports in 
equilibrium but the domestic firm prices lower than the monopoly price, welfare is a 
declining function of transport costs so that reductions in transport costs are welfare-
enhancing. Moreover, welfare under free trade (zero tariffs and transport costs) is 
found to be higher compared to welfare under autarky (prohibitive tariffs).  
These results show that, for welfare considerations, it matters whether trade 
costs assume the form of tariffs or transport costs. In particular, neither form of trade 
cost is a substitute for the other when considering trade policy. Trade liberalization, 
whether it takes the form of tariff reductions or reductions in transport costs, would be 
welfare enhancing only to the extent that the economy-wide gains from trade (if it 
occurs) outweighs the losses; or the gains to consumers from increased output 
outweighs the losses to firms from decreased profits if no trade occurs. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Simulation of the Welfare Function with Tariffs for A=1000 and t∈  [0, (2 ) 2A γ− ]. 
0.01γ =
 
200 400 600 800 1000
tariffs
500000
600000
700000
800000
900000
1×106
Social Welfare Function
 
0.5γ =
 
100 200 300 400 500 600 700
tariffs
450000
500000
550000
600000
650000
Social Welfare Function
 
0.9γ =
 
100 200 300 400 500
tariffs
400000
425000
450000
475000
500000
525000
Social Welfare Function
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Simulation of the Welfare Function with Transport Costs for A=1000 and  t∈  
[0, (2 ) 2A γ− ]. 
 
 
0.01γ =
 
200 400 600 800 1000
transport Cost
450000
500000
550000
600000
650000
700000
750000
Social Welfare Function
 
0.5γ =
 
100200300400500600700
transport Cost
400000
420000
440000
460000
480000
500000
Social Welfare Function
 
0.7γ =
 
100 200 300 400 500 600
transport Cost
420000
430000
440000
450000
460000
470000
Social Welfare Function
 
0.99γ =
 
100 200 300 400 500
transport Cost
400000
420000
440000
460000
480000
500000
Social Welfare Function
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
 
THE EFFECT OF OIL PRICE VOLATILITY ON THE TERMS OF TRADE AND 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION: A CASE STUDY OF NIGERIA 
 
 
Introduction 
 It has been observed by many authors5 that changes in the world price of primary 
exported commodities can have significant effect on economic activity and the terms 
of trade of exporting countries. Fluctuations in the terms of trade may be because 
countries export different basket of goods than they import; but may also be due to 
monopolistic tendencies (pricing-to-market) and other factors that cause deviations 
from the Law of One Price. These authors demonstrate that changes in the terms of 
trade of developing countries are mostly due to fluctuations in the world price of a 
single primary commodity which they export. Moreover, fluctuations in consumption 
patterns can be linked to fluctuations in the terms-of-trade.  
This paper studies the effects of oil (Nigeria’s primary export, comprising 
between 90-95% of merchandise exports over the sample period of my analysis) price 
volatility on Nigeria’s terms of trade and private consumption by considering a model 
of a small open economy in which a representative agent maximizes the expected 
discounted present value of utility—a function of consumption and leisure—subject to 
his resource constraints. The level of exports is endogenized and assumed to be a 
function of labor input alone. The reason for this assumption is because Nigeria, 
though an exporter of crude oil, imports gasoline for consumption. An implication of 
                                                
Cuddington and Urzúa, 1989; Bleaney and Greenaway, 1993; Backus and Crucini, 2000; 
Baxter and Kouparitsas, 2000; Bidarkota and Crucini; 2000 etc looked at the causes of 
fluctuations in the net barter terms of trade in recent years and most of them concluded that 
most of the variations in the net barter terms of trade can be attributed to variations in the 
price of oil. Moreover, most of the volatility in the terms of trade of developing countries are 
attributable to volatility in the prices of the primary commodities which they export. 
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this assumption, however, is that capital use will be captured by labor productivity, 
leading to a positive correlation between the two variables so that results would have 
to be interpreted with caution. 
I will study the effect of oil price volatility on the representative agent’s 
consumption pattern by addressing the following questions:  
1. How volatile and persistent are Nigeria’s terms of trade?  
2. What is the relationship between the terms of trade and world price of oil? 
3. How does volatility in the terms of trade affect the agent’s consumption? 
             In addressing the above questions, I will use multivariate linear systems 
method to compute population moments and impulse response of consumption to 
exogenous terms of trade shocks and carry out stochastic simulations of the linear 
optimal control problem associated with the model. The agent’s consumption pattern 
is expected to fluctuate with terms of trade shock. In particular, for the case of 
Nigeria, since oil exports constitutes about 95% of total export, a positive terms-of-
trade shock is expected to have a positive effect on oil export earnings and thus 
output. On the other hand, oil is also an input in other sectors of the economy so that a 
positive terms-of-trade shock would have a negative effect on output. Thus, the 
overall effect of a positive terms-of-trade shock on output would depend on which 
effect dominates. If the positive effect dominates, then a positive terms of trade shock 
should lead to an increase in consumption but if the negative effect dominates, then 
one is not likely to observe such an increase in consumption. 
 
Variance Decomposition of Output 
Before proceeding to a description of the model, I will carry out a variance 
decomposition of output. Variance decomposition is a different method of depicting 
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system dynamics and it decomposes variations in an endogenous variable into the 
component shocks to the endogenous variables in a Vector Auto Regressions (VAR) 
model. The variance decomposition gives information about the relative importance 
of each random innovation to the variables in the VAR.  All variables in the VAR are 
log-transformations of the original variables. The procedure is as follows:  
Consider a VAR of order p, 
 1 1 .....t t t p t p ty x A y A yβ ε− −= + + + +  where ty is a 
vector of k endogenous variables, tx is a vector of g exogenous variables comprising, 
in this case, of the relative price of oil and quantity of oil produced, and tε represents 
innovations at time t with variance Ω . If the VAR is invertible, the moving average 
(MA) representation is given by: 
 1 1 .....t t p t p ty A y A y ε− −= + + + = 
1
1( ..... )pp tI A L A L ε−− − − =  
                     
1
1( ..... )pp tI L L ε−+ Ψ + + Ψ  
where y  is the residual from regressing output on the relative price of oil and quantity 
of oil. The VAR coefficients, A, and the MA coefficients Ψ must satisfy   
1( ..... )ppI A L A L− − − 1( ..... )ppI L L+ Ψ + + Ψ = I 
   1( ..... )ppI c L c L I+ + + =  where 1 2 ...... 0c c= = = . 
Thus, 1 1AΨ = , 2 1 1 2A AΨ = Ψ + , ......., 1 1 2 2 ......s s s p s pA A A− − −Ψ = Ψ + Ψ + + Ψ . The s-
period ahead forecast error from the VAR is given by 1 1 1 1...t s t s s tε ε ε+ + − − ++ Ψ + + Ψ , 
which has a mean squared error ' '1 1 1 1..... s s− −Ω + Ψ ΩΨ + + Ψ ΩΨ  = 
' ' ' ' '
1 1 1 1.... s sPP PP PP− −+ Ψ Ψ + + Ψ Ψ = 
' ' ' ' '
1 1 1 1
1
( .... )
k
j j j j s j j s
j
p p p p p p
− −
=
+ Ψ Ψ + + Ψ Ψ∑  
where jp is the jth column of P, a  x k k  lower triangular matrix with the standard 
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deviations of the orthogonalized innovations along the main diagonal such that 
'PP = Ω .  
The variance decomposition of output for a 10-period forecast horizon is 
displayed below in tabular form for two different orderings of the relative price of oil 
and productivity. All the variables in the model are log-transformations of the original 
variables. The ordering of the variables is given at the bottom of each table. The 
column S.E. is the forecast error of output for each forecast horizon. The remaining 
columns give the percentage of the variance due to each innovation such that each 
row adds up to 100. Since output comes first in the VAR ordering, the only source of 
the one period ahead variation is its own innovation so that the first number is 100 
percent. 
Over the 10-period horizon, the oil price index is shown to contribute a 
significantly greater percentage of the variance in output compared to productivity, 
regardless of the ordering of the variables—an average of about 24%. Since the 
ordering of variables does not matter for the variance decomposition, shocks to 
productivity and the relative price of oil can be perceived as independent.  
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TABLE 1 
 
VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION OF OUTPUT 
 
Period S.E. GDP POIL LABORPROD 
     
1 0.030000 100.0000 0.000000 0.000000 
2 0.040442 95.04201 4.945196 0.012792 
3 0.045302 89.34683 10.62640 0.026774 
4 0.048609 83.28443 16.55643 0.159140 
5 0.051554 77.17922 22.47242 0.348364 
6 0.054467 71.33420 28.11369 0.552109 
7 0.057466 65.87156 33.38511 0.743336 
8 0.060601 60.83358 38.25523 0.911197 
9 0.063895 56.22073 42.72626 1.053008 
10 0.067363 52.01414 46.81618 1.169683 
 
Ordering: GDP LABORPROD POIL 
 
 
Period S.E. GDP POIL LABORPROD 
     
1 0.030000 100.0000 0.000000 0.000000 
2 0.040442 95.04201 4.945290 0.012698 
3 0.045302 89.34683 10.49099 0.162181 
4 0.048609 83.28443 16.16402 0.551558 
5 0.051554 77.17922 21.79094 1.029844 
6 0.054467 71.33420 27.14488 1.520915 
7 0.057466 65.87156 32.14820 1.980236 
8 0.060601 60.83358 36.77611 2.390319 
9 0.063895 56.22073 41.03218 2.747087 
10 0.067363 52.01414 44.93345 3.052414 
 
Ordering: GDP POIL LABORPROD 
 
 
Model Description 
Preferences 
 The representative agent has preferences
0
( , )t t t
t
U u C Lβ
∞
=
=∑ , 0 1β< < , 
where tC is the amount of the manufactured consumption good imported in exchange  
for oil at time t , tL is leisure at time t  and ( , )t tu C L is assumed strictly increasing in  
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its arguments, concave, twice continuously differentiable and tC , tL are assumed to  
be always interior. The functional form assumed for the utility function is: 
( , ) log( ) log( )t t t tu C L C L= + . 
 
Production Function 
 For the representative agent, output of oil at time t  is given by t t tY A N
α
= , 
where tA is productivity parameter at time t  and tN is labor input at time 
t  with 0tN > .The production function is assumed to be concave and twice 
continuously differentiable, which implies that labor’s share of output α satisfies 
0 1α< ≤ . 
 
Resource Constraint 
In each period, the representative agent faces two resources constraints: 
*) Total amount of time allocated to labor and leisure cannot exceed unity; 
1t tN L+ ≤ . Since the utility function and output are increasing in tL and 
tN respectively, we can assume that the constraint holds with equality. 
**) The value of consumption at any time t  cannot exceed the sum of disposable 
income and net change in financial wealth; 1(1 )t t t t t t tC q Y B R Bτ +≤ − + −  where the 
price of the consumption good has been normalized to unity, tq is the price of oil in 
terms of the consumption good, tτ  is the income tax rate, tB is the stock of bonds 
brought into time t , 1t tR r= + is the gross rate of return on bonds at time t , tr  being 
the real interest rate and 1tB +  is the stock of bond chosen at time t  for time 1t + .  
***) The exogenous variables in the model are labor productivity, the real gross rate 
of return on one-period bonds, government consumption tG , and the terms of trade tq .  
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Another variable not in the model but included in the solution algorithm for 
completeness and conformity with the programs to be used is lump-sum transfers tT . 
Lump-sum transfers are set to zero because the government rarely engages in such 
activities as payments of social security, unemployment compensation and other 
transfer payments to citizens. In fact, retirees sometimes are not paid their pension 
allowances for years at a time. To this end, the government is modeled as collecting 
income taxes but not making any transfer payments. Thus, the government’s budget 
constraint without debt financing is t t tG Yτ≤ , where tG is government expenditures 
on schools, roads, national security etc and t tYτ is revenue from income taxes at time 
t . For the rest of the analysis, the government is assumed to follow a balanced 
budget path in which t t tG Yτ=  for all t .  
 
Optimization Problem 
 The representative agent maximizes the expected discounted present value of utility 
subject to his resource constraints in * and **. The langragian for the optimization is: 
 1{ , } 0 0
[log( ) log(1 )] [(1 ) ]
t t
t t
t t t t t t t t t t tC N
t t
L Max C N A q N B R B C
α
β β λ τ
∞ ∞
+
= =
= + − + − + − −∑ ∑  
where tλ  is the shadow price of consumption and leisure and resource constraint 
multiplier at time t  and β is the rate of time preference. For ease of notation, let 
(1 )t tτ− = Ω , then the first order conditions with respect to tC , tN , 1tB +  and tλ  
respectively are: 
1 t tC λ=         (10) 
11 (1 )t t t t t tN A q N ααλ −− = Ω       (11) 
1 1{ }t t t tE Rβλ λ+ + =        (12) 
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1 0t t t t t t t tA q N B R B C
α
+Ω + − − =      (13) 
for all  0,1,2,....,t = ∞  and the transversality condition is 1lim 0t t tBλ→∞ + = . The above 
first order conditions can be interpreted in terms of equal marginal benefit and 
marginal cost. For example, the expression on the left hand side of condition (11) is 
the marginal utility from increasing leisure by one unit whereas that on the right hand 
side is the marginal cost, which is the value of the marginal product of labor (the 
foregone alternative) multiplied by the marginal utility of consumption that the extra 
labor input  would have generated. Also, expression (12) equates the marginal benefit 
from investing in one unit of bond today (which is the discounted marginal utility of 
consumption from the gross bond earnings) to the marginal cost (which is the 
marginal utility from consuming today instead of investing). Expression (13) is the 
intertemporal budget constraint. 
 
Near Steady State Dynamics 
In the steady state, tA A= , tC C= , tN N= , tq q= , 1t tλ λ λ+ = = , 
1t tB B B+ = = , 1t tR R R+ = = implying that 1 Rβ = . Since labor hours is restricted to 
be between zero and one, then the only feasible growth rate of hour per capita is zero. 
From the resource constraint, we have that consumption and output must grow at the 
same rate in the steady state but labor hours does not grow in the steady state since it 
is constrained to be between zero and one. Moreover, we have 1( )c bs s ββ−= Ω+ , 
where cs  and bs are consumption and bond share of output respectively. 
Linearization of (10)-(13) around the steady state levels ( ,C N , B and λ ) 
yields expressions for the percentage deviations from steady state levels, denoted by a 
circumflex (^).  
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ˆˆ
t tC λ− =                   (14) 
 t
ˆ ˆ ˆˆ
ˆ[ (1 )]
1 t t t t
N N A q
N
α λ+ − = + + + Ω
−
                          (15) 
1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ
t t tRλ λ+ +− + =                  (16) 
1
ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ
t b
t c t t t t t t
B sB s C N A R qαβ β+ − = − + Ω + Ω + + ΩΩ + Ω              (17) 
Moreover at base prices, we have: 
ˆˆ ˆ
t t tY A Nα= +                                     (18) 
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ( 1)t t t tY N A Nα− = + −                                  (19) 
The last two expressions give approximate solutions for output and labor productivity.  
 A detailed description of the solution algorithm for generating moments and impulse 
responses is provided in Appendix B. 
 
Data Description 
 Trends in Variables and Growth Rates 
 Data for this paper were extracted from different sources including the Energy 
Information Administration website, World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
and International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics. For some 
variables, data are available from 1960 to 2007 whereas others are only available from 
1980 to 2006. As a result, the sample period for all variables is taken to be 1980 to 
2006, which becomes a limitation of the model’s estimation. The series were either 
first-differenced or second-differenced to ensure stationarity before being used in the 
analysis. The line graphs below show trends in the log-levels and ratios of the 
variables as well as their growth rates over the period under study. 
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Fig. 11 Trend in Levels of Variables 
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Fig. 12  Trend in Ratios of Variables 
 
As is evident from the graph of the nominal exchange rate above, in the early 
1980’s, the Naira (Nigeria’s currency) had a high value in terms of the US dollar 
because the country had discovered oil a decade before and oil was in high demand; 
the agriculture sector was doing well and generating exports for the nation, although 
the exports generated by agriculture had declined compared to the period before the 
oil boom. At the same time, negative real interest rates prevailed ex-ante in the 
financial sector but the effect on the Naira wasn’t so obvious because the agriculture 
and oil sector more than made-up for the decline in investments that result from 
negative real interest rates.  
By the late 80’s to mid 90’s, the agriculture sector which relied heavily on 
government subsidies and incentives had been almost completely abandoned in favor 
of oil making the export base even more concentrated given that oil already 
contributed about 90% of merchandise exports at the time. At the same time, inflation 
based on consumer price index was up and rising and by the late 80’s to mid 90’s it 
had reached an average of 65%. Thus, in spite of the comparatively high nominal 
interest rates, negative real interest rates prevailed in the economy.  
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Although Nigeria is a small open economy, its financial market is 
underdeveloped and not fully integrated into the world economy an as such, the real 
interest rates differ from that of the world economy. In integrated financial markets, 
domestic investors have the ability to purchase foreign assets and foreign investors 
have the ability to purchase domestic assets. Countries that are fully integrated into 
world financial markets should have identical expected rates of return for identical 
assets regardless of location but this was certainly not the case for Nigeria. As a 
result, the country became vulnerable and its investment share of real GDP declined 
consistently over the late 1980s and early 1990s. This led to a decline in the demand 
for the Naira in international currencies market by investors and ultimately a collapse 
of the nominal exchange rate. The collapse of the value of the Naira in international 
currencies market in the 1990’s was the result of a combination of forces including a 
thin export base, weak domestic financial market and high inflationary conditions. 
Another expected trend that is noticeable from figure 1 is that of the relative 
price of oil. Oil prices have increased dramatically over the past few years; the 
consumer price index (converted to US dollar so that both the numerator and 
denominator of the index are denominated in the same currency)has also been rising 
over the past few years but not by as much as the surge in oil prices. Thus, the 
resulting ratio of both indexes (the relative price of oil) has shown an upward trend. 
Similar to this trend is that of the terms of trade which has been increasing since the 
late 1990s.  
Labor productivity and investment share of GDP—a measure of capital—also 
appear to have a similar trend according to the figure. As was mentioned earlier, 
although capital is not included in the model, it almost certainly still plays a role in 
the model’s dynamics through its effect on labor productivity.  
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Fig. 13 Trend in Growth Rates of Variables 
 
Business Cycle Statistics (Cyclicality, Volatility and Persistence) 
Three business cycle statistics are considered: cyclicality, volatility and persistence. 
The cyclicality of a variable is determined by the correlation of that variable with real 
GDP whereas volatility and persistence are measured by the standard deviation and 
first order autoregressive coefficients respectively. Augmented Dickey Fuller Unit 
Root tests were carried out to test for the stationarity of all variables and it was found 
that all the variables are integrated of order 1 (I (1)), except real GDP and gross 
investment which were integrated of order 2 (I (2)) at the five percent level of 
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significance. Thus, all I (1) series were first-differenced and both I (2) second-
differenced in order to render the series stationary so that the statistics are time 
independent. Table 2 below shows these statistics for variables considered in the 
model. 
The statistics show that the nominal exchange rate is countercyclical while the 
current account balance, terms of trade, relative price of oil, labor productivity, 
employment, investment, private consumption and the trade balance are all 
procyclical. Labor productivity, the most procyclical of all the series, is the least 
volatile while current account balance is the most volatile, followed by real 
investment, nominal exchange rate, the terms of trade, the trade balance, the relative 
price of oil, employment and private consumption.  
 
TABLE 2 
 
BUSINESS CYCLE STATISTICS 
 
CORRELATION WITH 
REAL GDP 
STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
FIRST ORDER AUTO 
REGRESSION COEFFICIENT 
CURRENT ACCOUNT 
BALANCE 
0.214 0.876 0.080 
LABOR 
PRODUCTIVITY 
0.969 0.109 -0.314 
EMPLOYMENT 0.414 0.203 -0.539 
NOMINAL EXCHANGE 
RATE 
-0.116 0.669 -0.122 
REAL GROSS 
INVESTMENT 
0.560 0.677 -0.120 
REAL PRIVATE 
CONSUMPTION 
0.219 0.189 0.123 
TRADE BALANCE 0.214 0.474 0.080 
TERMS OF TRADE 0.047 0.566 0.46 
RELATIVE PRICE  OF 
OIL 
0.260 0.422 -0.73 
 
The terms of trade, ratio of export price index to import price index, is found 
to exhibit more volatility than the relative price of oil, ratio of oil price index to 
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domestic CPI. Although crude oil is the country’s major export commodity, the 
country imports gasoline because of its low refining capacity. Thus, the price of oil is 
captured in both the export price index and import price index.  
The effect of oil prices would be more dominant in the export price index than 
the import price index since oil constitutes the bulk of exports whereas machinery, 
transport equipments and manufactures whose prices are relatively less volatile 
constitute the bulk of import—about 68%.  If the covariance between the export price 
index and import price index is negligible, given that the prices of the other imported 
commodities do not vary much, then volatility in the terms of trade would be mostly 
due to volatility in world oil prices. Also, there are other factors other than crude oil 
prices that influence the terms of trade, like tariffs, exchange rates etc, so that the 
volatility of the terms trade will also depend on the volatility of  all these other 
factors. 
With regard to persistence, the relative price of oil is the most persistent 
whereas the current account balance and trade balance are the least persistent; 
meaning that shocks to the relative price of oil will take longer to die out compared to 
shocks to any of the other variables.  
 
Model Estimation and Results 
   Ordinary Least Squares Regressions are run to determine the relationship, if 
any, between the oil price index relative to the domestic CPI and the terms of trade 
and then the terms of trade and growth rate of private consumption expenditure. 
 Modified versions of the R.G. King (1987) Matlab programs EC475#2 and 
EC475#3 are employed in the computation of population moments and impulse 
responses.  
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Parameters of the original programs are calibrated to the data for Nigeria. Data 
for real returns on bonds is not available and computation of the real interest rate 
using the nominal returns on three month deposits and inflation based on consumer 
price index led to a negative average real interest rate over the period under study. To 
side step this problem, an output function depending on labor and capital was 
estimated for the economy and the estimated value of marginal product of capital was 
taken to be the real interest rate, a value of 2 percent. Values of parameters used in the 
computation of population moments and impulse response are given in table 3 below. 
 
TABLE 3 
 
 DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES AND VALUES OF PARAMETERS 
Variable  Description  Value 
nbar Steady State Level of Hours 0.2 
alpha Labor’s Share of Output 0.9 
gammax Growth Rate of Labor Augmenting Technical Change 1 
r Real Interest Rate 0.02 
beta Time Preference Parameter 0.98 
capomega One Minus the Tax Percentage 0.8 
sb Bond’s Share of Output 0.1 
sT Transfer’s Share of Output 0 
sc Consumption Share of Output 0.802 
avrelpoil Average Relative Price of Oil over Sample Period Normalized to One 1 
Rho Diagonal Transition Matrix of Forcing Variables 0.9 
 
Table 4 below shows the estimated coefficients of the OLS regressions with 
Heteroscedasticity-Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) standard errors and co-
variances. Dependent variables are in columns and the explanatory variable, the 
relative price of oil, in row, with p-values in parentheses.  These estimates are 
generated so as to determine whether variations in the terms of trade can be explained 
by variations in world oil prices—the second question of this paper, and also to 
determine the supply response of oil to changes in the relative price of oil. Variables 
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were log-transformed before they were used in the regressions. The two regressions 
that were run included: 
1( )
x o
t t
tm
t t
p p
v
p cpi
χ δ= + +      (20) 
1( )
o
t
t t
t
pO
cpi
ϑ φ ε= + +       (21) 
where , ,  and  
x o
t t
tm
t t
p p O
p cpi
 represent the terms of trade, relative price of oil, and oil 
export at time t respectively. The variables at the end of the equations are the error 
terms which capture the effects of other potential explanatory variables not included 
in the models. 
The terms of trade is modeled as a function of the relative price of oil. All else 
equal, an increase in the relative price of oil, since oil is a major component of 
exports, should lead to an increase in the export price index; also, since gasoline is 
imported, an increase in the relative price of oil should lead to an increase in the 
import price index. If the covariance between the export price index and import price 
index is negligible, then one would expect variations in the terms of trade to be mostly 
explained by variations in world oil prices.  
Finally, oil exports are modeled as determined by relative oil prices alone in 
order to determine the country’s supply response of oil to changes in world oil prices.  
These regressions were used because the sole objective was to determine the 
relationship between the variables of interest and whether the relationship between 
them is significant. Results of the regressions analyses show a significantly positive 
relationship between the terms of trade and the relative price of oil; also variations in 
the terms of trade are shown to be explained mostly by variations in the relative price 
of oil—a high 83% as shown by an R2 value of  0.83.  This is not surprising since 
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machinery, transportation equipment and manufactures whose prices are relatively 
less volatile, constitute about 68% of imports, so that much of the variations come 
from the relative price of oil. 
There is also a significantly positive supply response of oil to the relative price 
of oil. Thus, with increasing world oil prices, revenues from oil exports would 
increase, leading to an increase in GDP.  
 
TABLE 4 
 
 RESULTS OF REGRESSIONS ANALYSES 
 Terms of Trade Oil Export 
Relative Price of Oil 0.425 (0.001)* 
0.48 
(0.000)* 
* Denotes significance at the 5% level. 
 
The table below, derived from running the aforementioned PC-Matlab 
programs, shows the coefficients of the decision rules and hence the linkage between 
the co-state variable (shadow price of consumption), controls (private consumption 
and labor input) and flow variables (wages and output); and the state variable (bonds) 
and exogenous variables (productivity, real interest rate, tax rate and the terms of 
trade). 
The results show that an increase in productivity has the same effect on consumption and 
employment as an increase in the terms of trade or an income tax reduction.  This could be because the 
persistence parameters were set to be the same for all shocks since I am unable to test for differences in 
persistence across variables given the limited time span of the data.   
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TABLE 5 
 
 SIMULATION RESULTS 
 Bonds 
(B) 
Productivity 
(A) 
Real Interest 
Rate (R) 
Terms of 
Trade (q) 
Capomega 
( Ω ) 
Shadow Price of 
Consumption (λ) 
-0.0070 -0.1666 7.4941 -0.1666 -0.1666 
Private 
Consumption (c) 
0.0070 0.1666 -7.4941 0.1666 0.1666 
Labor Input (n) -0.0200 2.3813 21.4116 2.3813 2.3813 
Wage (w) 0.0000 0.0000 0.9000 0.0000 0.0000 
Output (y) -0.0180 3.1432 19.2704 2.1432 2.1432 
 
 
Another reason for productivity, terms of trade and income tax shocks having 
the same effect on consumption and employment in the model is because they are 
isomorphic due to the set up of the model, i.e. their effect of a percentage change on 
consumption and effort are of identical form in the model. For example, from 
equation 6, a percentage change in either productivity, terms of trade or income tax 
will lead to a change in effort of magnitude 11[ (1 )] 1 / 0.35NN α −− + − ≡  percentage, 
given the models parameters. Thus, a modification of the model might lead to 
differences in the effects of all three shocks. 
A reduction in income taxes by one percent will result in an increase in 
employment by 2.4%, leading to an overall increase in output of 2.1% and a jump in 
private consumption to a new higher steady state level by 0.17%.  
Although the effects of an increase in productivity are similar to those of a tax 
reduction, the former has a larger effect on output because an increase in productivity 
generates additional increase in output leading to more than a ‘one-to-one’ effect 
whereas a decrease in income tax leads to an increase in effort since the incentive to 
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work increases, but the effect on output of the increase in effort is less than ‘one-to-
one’ since labor’s share of output is less than unity.    
Focusing on the effects of changes in the terms of trade, the main objective of 
this paper, the result that private consumption responds positively to a shock in the 
terms of trade by jumping to a new higher steady state arises due to the constancy of 
the real interest rate combined with the permanent income hypothesis behavior of 
consumption; changes that are perceived transitory such as a temporary shock in the 
terms of trade would have no effect on private consumption over time.  
The real interest rate and private consumption exhibit a negative relationship. 
The negative response of private consumption to real interest rate as shown in this 
model arises due to the reinforcement of the substitution effect by the income effect. 
An increase in the real interest rate is an increase in the opportunity cost of current 
consumption leading to a negative substitution effect; an increase in the real interest 
rate also leads to an increase in the consumer’s value of wealth which should lead to 
an increase in private consumption; also for an underdeveloped and highly indebted 
country like Nigeria, the net-indebtedness is negative leading to a negative wealth 
effect. Thus, the overall effect of real interest rate on private consumption is negative.  
The figures below show impulse response of private consumption, effort and 
output to a unit shock in the terms of trade and the real interest rate.  Similar to the 
simulation results, private consumption is shown to jump to a new higher level with a 
terms-of-trade shock but does not change over time. Also, labor input decreases over 
time with a terms of trade shock, whereas output increases over time.  
An increase in a country’s export price index relative to its import price index 
leads to increased export and thus, increased output. Since output equals income in 
equilibrium, income increases; as income increases, leisure increases so that labor 
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input decreases over time. As with the simulation results, the effect of a unit shock in 
productivity and taxes are the same as with a terms-of-trade shock and as such not 
included here. 
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Fig. 14. Effect of a Unit Terms of Trade Shock 
 
On the other hand, a unit increase in the steady state level of bonds cause a 
jump in the levels of private consumption, effort or output over time; private 
consumption jumps to a new higher steady state level and remains there, whereas 
effort and output jump to new lower steady state levels. An increase in the steady state 
level of bonds leads to an increase in wealth for the representative consumer. As a 
result, private consumption jumps up, effort down and output down since output 
depends on effort. Since the variables do not show any trend over time with respect to 
a unit increase in bond, the impulse response graphs are not presented below. 
Finally, a shock to the interest rate leads to an increase in private consumption 
over time because it increases the value of wealth over time. As the value of wealth 
increases, the representative agent consumes more leisure and reduces effort, leading 
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to a decline in output over time. This indicates that there is a role to be played by the 
financial market in affecting growth in private consumption over time. 
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Fig. 15. Effect of a Unit Interest Rate Shock 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
  I studied the effect of oil price volatility on a representative agent’s 
consumption pattern and Nigeria’s terms of trade. A small open economy rational 
expectations model was considered. Ordinary Least Squares regressions were 
estimated to determine the percentage variation in the terms of trade that can be 
explained by variations in the relative price of oil.  I find that variability in the terms 
of trade can be mostly explained by variability in world oil prices.  
For a small open economy with a concentrated export base and well 
diversified import base, it is expected that increases in the price of its principal export 
and thus its export price index be reflected in its terms of trade. In the case of Nigeria, 
oil though a major export, is also an import so that fluctuations in oil prices are 
captured by both the export price index and import price index. If the export price 
  
 
66 
 
 
index and import price index do not vary much together, then volatility in oil prices 
would lead to an even greater volatility in the terms of trade. 
Computations of moments and impulse responses were also carried out using a 
linear approximations approach and solution algorithm introduced by R.G. King 
(1987).  I find that real private consumption jumps to a new higher steady state level 
with a terms-of-trade shock but does not change over time.  
I also find that real private consumption improves over time with a real 
interest rate shock and that this effect is stronger compared to that of productivity and 
the terms of trade. Thus, in order for real interest rate shocks to have positive wealth 
effects and lead to improvements in private consumption in the long run, policies that 
strengthen the financial markets and lead to debt reduction should be emphasized. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Solution Algorithm 
 Expressions (14) and (15) relate the controls ˆtC and ˆ tN to the controlled state 
and co-state variables, ˆtB and ˆtλ , as well as the exogenous variables ˆtA , ˆtR ,  ˆ  tO , ˆtT  
, ˆtq and ˆ tΩ  . These expressions may be written as: 
ˆ
ˆ
ˆˆ ˆ
ˆˆ ˆ
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t
t
tt t
cc cs ce
t t t
t
t
A
R
BC O
M M M
N T
q
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 
 
 
   
 
= +  
         
 
 
Ω  
                (22) 
where the ccM and csM are 2x2 matrices as there are two control variables and two 
state, co-state variables and the 
ceM is a 2x6 matrix as there are six exogenous 
variables in the model.  
ccM relates controls to controls, csM relates controls to states 
and 
ceM relates controls to exogenous variables. Thus, we have that 
1                      0
0     (1 )
1
cc
M N
N
α
− 
 
=
 + −
− 
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0    1
0    1cs
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 
 and 0  0 0 0 0 0
1  0  0 0 1 1 ce
M  =  
 
 
Expressions (16) and (17) relate variations in controlled state and co-state to 
variations in controls and exogenous variables. These expressions may be written as: 
1
1
1 1 1
11 1
1
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ˆ
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where ( )ssM B , ( )scM B  and ( )seM B  are matrix polynomials in the backshift operator 
B at most of power 1. The notations are the same as above, so that
ssM  relates state to 
state variables, etc.  The above can be rewritten as  
1
1
1 1 1
0 1 0 1 0 1
11 1
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So that 
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Since 
ccM is a square matrix, ccM is invertible; thus, from expression (22), we have 
that 
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Since 
0scM  is a zero matrix, expression (14) reduces to 
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and substitution of expression (26) into the above yields 
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Let 1 10 1 1[ ] [ ]ss ss sc cc csW M M M M M− −= − − , 10[ ]ss seoX M M−=  and 
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0 1 1[ ] [ ]ss se sc cc ceZ M M M M M− −= + , then expression (28) can be written as  
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The matrix W is referred to as the State Co-state transition matrix and given the 
matrices above, we have that 
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The eigenvalues of W are 1(1,  )β ′ and the corresponding Eigen vectors are 
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Define V as the matrix of Eigenvectors of W and µ a diagonal matrix with the Eigen 
values of W arranged in ascending absolute value, then  
1
+( )s
1 (1 )
     11( )
1                                           0
bN
V
β
α β
β
β
Ω − 
 
− −
 
−=  
 
 
 
 and 
1       0
10     
µ
β
 
 
=
 
  
  
The solution to the difference equation at date t  is given by  
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∑ ∑
 
In combination with the law of motion for the exogenous variables, the 
expressions above form a linear system which consists of the state ( ˆB ), co-state ( ˆλ ) 
and the exogenous variables to be used for the computation of (i) impulse responses; 
(ii) population moments; and (iii) stochastic simulations. With a single bond stock and 
first order autoregressive processes for the exogenous variables, the linear system that 
expresses the optimal evolution of the state variable (B) and the exogenous state 
variables A, R, q, and Ω  is: 
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where Aε , Rε , Oε , Tε , qε  and εΩ  are shocks to the system which are serially 
uncorrelated but may be contemporaneously correlated. The 
 jiρ  coefficients, 
{ }, j  ,  R, O, T, q,  i A= Ω , govern the model’s exogenous dynamics and under the 
assumption that the shocks to the system are temporary, the exogenous process for ˆA, 
ˆR, ˆ O , ˆT , qˆ and ˆΩ is stationary. This paper adopts the R.G. King (1987) Matlab 
programs EC475#2 and EC475#3 for computation of impulse responses and 
population moments, making slight adjustments to accommodate parameters of my 
model where necessary.   
The interest of this paper is in the productivity and the terms of trade shocks. 
Given the limited data used for this analysis, differences in persistence parameters 
could not be estimated. Also, the results of the variance decomposition of output 
coupled with the very low values of the off-diagonal elements of the covariance 
matrix of the terms of trade and productivity—0.0002, suggests that the shocks are 
independent. Thus, the diagonal elements of the M system matrix above are assumed 
to be equal and the off-diagonal elements are set to zero, so that M becomes an upper 
triangular matrix. 
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